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Abstract
Standard semantic treatments of counterfactuals appeal to a relation of
similarity between possible worlds. Similarity, however, is a vague no-
tion. Lewis suggests reducing the vagueness of similarity by adopting a
principle known as ‘late departure’ (LD): the more the past two worlds
share, the more they are similar. LD has several virtues. However, as
Bennett points out, a standard semantics based on LD suffers from the so-
called coat problem. In a nutshell, we are led to assign counterintuitive
truth-values to counterfactuals whose antecedent time is left underspeci-
fied. In the present paper, we argue that the coat problem may be solved
by defining a time-sensitive notion of similarity. To illustrate, we assume
a Priorean, tensed language, interpreted on branching-time frames in the
usual, ‘Ockhamist’ way, and we enrich it with a counterfactual connec-
tive. Within this framework, we define a time-sensitive relation of sim-
ilarity, based on Yablo’s work on truth-makers and partial truth. In the
resulting semantics, which has independent interest, the coat problem
does not arise.
Keywords: Branching-time, Counterfactuals, Truth-maker, Partial truth
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1 A problem for the late departure principle
By a counterfactualwemean a subjunctive conditional ‘IfAwere the case,
Bwould be the case’ (A2→B) with false antecedent (see, e.g., [13, 173]).
Here is the standard semantic clause for counterfactuals, as developed
in [12]:
Standard counterfactual semantics (CS):
A 2→B is true at a world w iff:
(a) either w has no access to any A-world (the vacuous case); or
(b) some (A∧ B)-world is more similar to w than any (A∧¬B)-
world.
Comparative similarity (with the world of evaluation) is a key ingre-
dient of CS. Similarity, however, may be unsatisfying, for it displays a
high degree of vagueness. As Lewis [10] points out, the vagueness of
similarity cannot be entirely dispelled, for counterfactuals are intrinsi-
cally vague. Nevertheless, it can be significantly attenuated.
A first step in this direction is that of characterising comparative
similarity as a reflexive and transitive relation, that is, as a preorder.
Moreover, as Lewis [11] points out, the vagueness of similarity can be
further reduced. Let us focus on non-backtracking counterfactuals, that
is, roughly, counterfactuals whose antecedents are about eventualities
that obtain before (or simultaneously with) the eventualities the conse-
quents are about, as in “If John missed the train, he would still be in
London”. Non-backtracking counterfactuals, Lewis contends, are eval-
uated against possible antecedent scenarios that keep, as far as possible,
the actual past fixed (for a study providing empirical support to Lewis’s
insight, see [7]). According to Lewis, in assessing these counterfactu-
als, we should focus on those worlds that share with the actual world
as much of their past as possible, except for the stretch of time strictly
needed to make the antecedent true. If Lewis is right, then, it is natu-
ral to require that the similarity relation satisfy the following principle
(this and the other principles we discuss are assumed to hold for non-
backtracking counterfactuals and to impose ceteris paribus conditions on
similarity):
Late departure principle (LD):
The more the past two worlds share, the more they are similar.1
1See [13] for a counterfactual semantics that encodes principle LD.
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It is easy to refine principle LD in formal terms. A very natural math-
ematical background against which LD can be refined is that of the so-
called branching-time frames. In this paper, we discuss versions of prin-
ciple LD that are made precise within these frames.
To sum up, principle LD helps to reduce the vagueness of similarity,
it appears to be involved in counterfactual reasoning, and it has rigor-
ous, formal translations. Onemay be tempted, then, to assume LDwith
full confidence. Unfortunately, LD is problematic.
As Bennett [2] shows, if LD is taken to determine the relation of sim-
ilarity (and assuming something like a branching conception of time),
the resulting counterfactual semantics suffers from the so-called coat
problem. Suppose that John’s coat was not stolen from the restaurant
where he left it. Moreover, assume that there were just two, equally
good, chances for it to be stolen, the former at 1 pm and the latter at
1:30 pm. If the coat were stolen at 1:30 pm, then the thief would sell
the coat to a pawnbroker named Fence. Since the latter chance for theft
is the one that would obtain later, it obtains in the latest world depart-
ing from actuality, among those where the coat is stolen. Thus, if LD is
adopted, CS predicts the truth of:
(1) If John’s coat had been stolen, it would now be in Fence’s shop.
Intuitively, this result is unwelcome. If we take CS for granted, we can
conclude that LD leads to counterintuitive results. This is the coat prob-
lem.
In this paper we argue that the coat problem does nothing to under-
mine the key motivations that justify principle LD. Rather, it just shows
that LD is not general enough, that there are limits in the kind of cases
it can be sensibly applied to. In [13, 191] it is suggested that the the coat
problem highlights a difficulty of LD that eludes formal treatment. In
our view, this suggestion is too hasty. As we shall see, once the limits
of LD are put to the fore, it is possible to define a more general princi-
ple, which retains all the virtues of LD and vindicates the same basic
insights without falling prey to the coat problem.
A disclaimer. It is not part of our aim to offer a variant of LD that
escapes any known difficulty. To be sure, the coat problem is not the
only problem that must be solved (or at least put into perspective) if LD
and similar principles are to be applied to a sufficiently wide range of
cases (see, for instance, the so-called late departure problem discussed
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in [13] and [16]). However, as far as we can see, there is no problem
affecting our variant, which does not affect LD as well.
2 A Priorean revision of the late departure princi-
ple
In the celebrated paper Identifiable individuals [14], Prior discusses the
view that a person could have had different parents than the ones he
actually had. According to Prior, in assessing counterfactual hypotheses
of this kind, philosophers are often led to neglect a key issue. In his own
words:
It is always a useful exercise (and one insufficiently prac-
tised by philosophers), when told that somethingwas possi-
ble, i.e. could have happened, to ask ‘Whenwas it possible?’
‘When could it have happened?’ (70)
This recommendation has deep connections with other key contribu-
tions from Prior, such as his seminal works in the semantics and meta-
physics of historical modality.
We suggest that the coat problemdepends precisely on the oversight
Prior mentions in the above quote, that is, neglecting the role of time
in assessing modal claims. Exactly as the modal properties of certain
individuals may change across time (as Prior observes), so may change
the relative similarity of certain worlds. With this in mind, consider the
following principle.
LD* The more the past two worlds do not share, the more they are
dissimilar.
Under reasonable assumptions, LD* is equivalent to LD. Nonetheless,
LD* and LD interact in a different waywith Prior’s recommendation, as
the former is much easier to turn into a principle connecting time and
(dis)similarity. Here is the principle, that is, the time-relativised version
of LD*:
Dynamic late departure principle (DLD): The more the past two
worlds do not share at a given time, the more they are dissimilar at
that time (or, if you prefer, up to that time).
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To make DLD precise, we need to define a formally respectable,
time-sensitive relation of past-(not-)sharing. To this aim, we adopt a
branching-time conception, inwhichworlds are identifiedwith histories,
that is, spatially and temporally complete courses of physical events. A
branching time structure or tree is, roughly, a bunch of histories that
share an initial, ‘past’ part and divide afterwards, yielding different
branches.
If h is the actual history (i.e., the history of evaluation) and h′ is a
history divided from h at time t, we call a non-actual stretch of h′ the part
of h′ that goes from t to the time of branching between h and h′ (which
we indicate as hYh′, see figure 1).2 By DLD, the shorter the non-actual
stretch of h′ at t is, the more similar h′ is to actuality at t.
J
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Figure 1: The non-actual stretch of h′ at t (highlighted in black).
Before returning to the coat problem, let us spend a few words of
comment on principle DLD. Admittedly, DLD is conceptually more
costly than LD, for it requires that different histories be temporally com-
parable or ‘synchronised’ (see below, p. 4). However, there are indepen-
dent reasons to pay the price (see, e.g., [4, 265–266]). Once synchronised
trees are adopted, it is hard to see why someone who leans towards LD
may be willing to reject its time-relativised version DLD. After all, for
any time t, if we use LD and DLD to measure the comparative similar-
ity of two histories that are divided at t, then the two principles yield
precisely the same verdict. In addition to that, DLD allows us to com-
pare distinct histories relative to different times—a kind of comparison
that makes perfect sense within the branching-time conception. As we
shall argue in the next section, this feature ofDLD is key to solving the
coat problem.
2We assume a discrete temporal ordering. For a formal definition of trees, see § 4.
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3 Outline of a solution to the coat problem
Let us familiarly speak of an antecedent truth-maker to indicate an event
that would make the antecedent true, and let us speak of an antecedent
time to indicate the time at which a truth-maker of the antecedent ob-
tains (for more precise characterisations of these notions, see below, §§ 5
and 6).3
Consider again the scenario described by Bennett, as represented in
figure 2. John’s coat is not stolen in the actual history h but might have
been in two specific occasions, O1 (which would obtain only at 1 pm on
h1) andO2 (only at 1:30 pm on h2). BothO1 andO2 are antecedent truth-
makers. Let us assume that h1 is the O1-history that has the shortest
non-actual stretch at the relevant antecedent time 1 pm. Analogously,
h2 is theO2-history that has the shortest non-actual stretch at antecedent
time 1:30 pm. In figure 2, the non-actual stretch of h1 at 1 pm is the
distance from 12:45 pm (time hYh1) to 1 pm (the antecedent time cor-
responding to O1), and the non-actual stretch of h2 at 1:30 pm is the
distance from 1:15 pm (time hYh2) to 1:30 pm (the antecedent time cor-
responding to O1). Both stretches are 15 minutes long. The coat now
would be in Fence’s shop (scenario S) if, and only if, O2 had obtained.
h2h1 h rr
r
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Figure 2: A partial representation of Bennett’s scenario.
This is Bennett’s counterfactual:
(1) If John’s coat had been stolen, it would now be in Fence’s shop.
It has been noted that the antecedent of (1) is underspecified, in that
3In [6], Kit Fine adopts a counterfactual semantics based on the so-called truth-
maker semantics. Our proposal differs from Fine’s account, for it mixes possible worlds
semantics with truth-maker semantics. For a similar approach, see [5].
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there are two distinct antecedent truth-makersO1 andO2 (see, e.g., [8]).
More importantly for us, the antecedent is temporally underspecified, as
there are two different antecedent times, 1 pm and 1:30 pm. We can
make this temporal underspecification explicit by replacing (1) with:
(2) If John’s coat had been stolen either at 1 pm or at 1:30 pm, it would
now be in Fence’s shop.4
When the antecedent time is uniquely specified, LDmeasures precisely
what it is supposed to measure: how long a counterfactual history has
to be divided from actuality to make the antecedent true. When the
antecedent time is underspecified, however, LD may go astray. This
is precisely what happens in the coat problem. By LD, h2 is deemed
closer to actuality than h1 just because the time of O2 is later than that
of O1. Thus, by CS, it turns out that (2) is true, against common intu-
itions. Now, let us seewhyDLD fares better than LD in this respect. As
just seen, (2) is temporally underspecified in that it has two antecedent
times. Accordingly, the task of evaluating (2) boils down to the follow-
ing tasks:
(i) consider 1 pm, that is, the antecedent time of the truth-maker O1,
and assign to theO1-histories a measure of similarity with actual-
ity at 1 pm;
(ii) repeat the same operation with the antecedent time of the truth-
maker O2;
(iii) apply CS to all antecedent histories, using the measures of simi-
larity assigned at points (i), (ii).
It should be clear that, differently from LD, the variant DLD we are
proposing is perfectly adequate for tasks (i) and (ii). In a branching-
time structure, if h is the actual history, for each antecedent history h′
with antecedent time t, there exists a unique non-actual stretch of h′ at t.
ByDLD, the length n of this stretch counts as ameasure of dissimilarity
from actuality. Thus, we are in a position to apply CS in the usual way:
a counterfactual A 2→B is presently true iff B is true in all A-worlds
whosemeasure n is smaller than that of anyA-world inwhichB is false.
4It has been recently argued that counterfactuals with disjunctive antecedent pose
serious problems to any semantics based onCS (see, e.g., [3]). Albeit we think that these
problems are worth considering, discussing them is beyond the scope of this paper.
129
DLD enables to get the coat story right: since the non-actual stretch
of h1 at the (antecedent) time of O1 is as long as that of history h2 at the
(antecedent) time of O2, both histories count as equally similar to actu-
ality. Since S is true at h2 only, however, statement (2) (or, equivalently,
(1)) is false at the actual history. Notice that when the antecedent is not
temporally underspecified—when a unique antecedent time exists—
DLD and LD agree on the similarity ordering. In the next section we
outline a formal version of this preliminary analysis.
4 Counterfactuals and branching-time structures
As said above, our solution requires that all histories in the tree are
temporally comparable. Accordingly, we choose a suitable brand of
branching-time structures, viz., sinchronised trees (see [4, 269–273], see
also [1, 195–196]).
A synchronised tree T is defined as a tuple (M, ⪯, d), where M
is a nonempty set of entities called moments, and ⪯ is a partial order
onM , which corresponds to the (improper) precedence relation onM
(≺ ,⪰, and ≻ are defined in the obvious way). To keep the formal com-
plexity to a minimum, we assume that ⪯ is a discrete ordering. Nothing
philosophically important hinges on this assumption. A history is de-
fined as a maximal set of moments in ⪯. Moreover, letting m,m′ and
m′′ vary over moments:
(a) ifm′ ⪯̸ m′′ andm′′ ⊀ m′, somem is such thatm ≺ m′ andm ≺ m′′;
(b) ifm′ ≺ m andm′′ ≺ m, eitherm′ ⪯ m′′, orm′′ ≺ m′;
(c) histories are all isomorphic;
(d) a time t is a set of moments that intersects each history at precisely
one moment. We also write th to indicate the moment in t ∩ h.
(e) times preserve the order of the corresponding moments (that is,
th ≺ t′h entails th′ ⪰̸ t′h′). We shall say that t is earlier than t′ iff
th ≺ t′h for some h.
d is a metric function that assigns to any pair (t, t′) of times a non-
negative number n expressing the temporal distance between t and t′
(see [9] for details). We require that t′ = t′′ iff th ≺ t′h, t′′h′ entails d(t, t′) =
d(t, t′′).
The language LT is a standard tensed propositional language en-
dowed with a set Atom of countable atoms p, q, p1, . . . , and with two
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sentential operators P (‘Sometimes in the past’) and F (‘Sometimes in
the future’). We indicate as H and G the duals of P,F, respectively. As
usual, atoms are thought of as simple, present tensed sentences that
contain no ‘trace of futurity’.
A standard semantics forLT is Prior’s [15]Ockhamist semantics, which
evaluates sentences ofLT atmoment-history pairs. AnOckhamistmodel
is a tupleMO = (T , I), where T is a tree and I an interpretation func-
tion from Atom ×M onto the set {0, 1} of truth-values. Elements of I
are called assignments. Ockhamist truth is defined in the usual, recur-
sive way (clauses for booleans and reference to models are omitted; we
abbreviate {th, h} as t/h):
t/h ⊨ p iff I(p, th) = 1;
t/h ⊨ PA iff ∃t′(t′h ≺ th & t′/h ⊨ A);
t/h ⊨ FA iff ∃t′(th ≺ t′h & t′/h ⊨ A).
Now, let us enrich LT with connective2→, yielding language LTC . The
syntax of LC is defined in the obvious way. We ignore complications
that depend on embedding counterfactuals one into another.
To interpretLTC in accordancewith theOckhamist semantics, coun-
terfactuals are themselves to be evaluated relative to moment-history
pairs. As argued in [16, 182–185], the moments that are relevant for as-
sessing A 2→B at a point t/h are those located at t. Clause CSmust be
modified accordingly:
CS* t/h ⊨ A 2→B iff
(a) either no t/h′ satisfies A, for any history h′, or
(b) some (A ∧ B)-point t/h′ is strictly more similar to t/h than
any (A ∧ ¬B)-point t/h′′.
For our purposes, claims about the similarity of two points t/h and t/h′
boils down to claims concerning the similarity of histories h and h′ up
to time t.
5 Similarity, truth-makers, and antecedent times
Clause CS* requires that a notion of comparative similarity between
moment-history pairs be provided. Both LD and DLD can be used to
perform this task.
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Let us start with LD. Recall that histories branch off from one an-
other only towards the future. Thus, to say that the more the past two
worlds share the more they are similar amounts to saying that the more
the moments two histories share, the more they are similar. Let us call
LD-similarity the notion of comparative similarity that we can distil
along these lines. Formally, h′ is at least as LD-similar to h as h′′ iff
h′ ∩ h ⊇ h′′ ∩ h (see [13] and [18]). Based on LD-similarity, it is straight-
forward to define a comparative notion of LD*-similarity between an-
tecedent moment-history pairs: A-point t/h′ is as LD*-similar to t/h as
A-point t/h′′ if and only if h′ is as LD-similar to h as h′′.
To get a semantics for counterfactuals, it is sufficient to identify the
similarity relation in CS* with LD*-similarity. As expected, the result-
ing semantics falls prey to the coat problem. If h, h1 and h2 are as in
figure 2, then the following formal version of (2) turns out to be true at
Now/h:
(3) (Po1 ∨ Po2) 2→ s
Let us now considerDLD. We start by offering a formal counterpart
of the above, intuitive notion of a truth-maker, based on Yablo’s work
[17, Chap. 4]. We identify a truth-maker of A at t/h (tmk(A, t/h) in
symbols) with a minimal model of A at t/h. In turn, a minimal model is
a set of assignments that is, intuitively, as small as is strictly necessary
to make A true at t/h. More formally, given a model MO = (T , I), a
truth-maker tmk(A, t/h) is a set of assignments such that:
(i) tmk(A, t/h) ⊆ I;
(ii) if anOckhamistmodelM′O = (T , I ′) is such that tmk(A, t/h) ⊆ I ′,
thenM′O, t/h ⊨ A;
(iii) if f is a set of assignments such that tmk(A, t/h) ⊃ f ,
then some Ockhamist modelM′O = (T , I ′)
is such that I ′ ⊃ f andM′O, t/h ⊭ A.
If a truth-maker assigns a value to a pair (p, th), we shall say that it covers
time t (on h). Moreover, a set f is a possible truth-maker of A at t/h in
MO = (T , I) if, for some Ockhamist modelM′O = (T , I ′), f is a truth-
maker ofA at t/h inM′O. We indicate a possible truth-maker ofA at t/h
as 3tmk(A, t/h).
Some comments are in order. First, if a sentenceA is true at a point,
there exists at least one truth-maker of A at that point. However, a
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sentence can have more than one truth-maker at a point. For instance,
there are exactly two possible truth-makers of (p ∨ ¬q) at t/h, namely,
{(p, th) 7→ 1} and {(q, th) 7→ 0}. If (p ∨ ¬q) is true at t/h, at least one
of these possible truth-makers is also actual. But nothing forbids both
from being actual.
Second, tmk(A, t/h) need not cover time t. Consider, for instance,
Pp at point t/h, and suppose that I(p, t′h) = 1, with t′h ≺ th. Then,
{(p, t′h)→ 1} is a truth-maker of Pp at t/h but does not cover t at all.
Third, a truth-maker may cover more than one time. Suppose, for
instance, that (p ∧ Pq) is true at t/h. If so, its truth-makers at t/h must
cover exactly two times, that is, be of form {(p, th) 7→ 1, (q, t′h) 7→ 1}
(with t′h ≺ th).
To see how truth-makers enable us to dealwith temporal underspec-
ification, let us start by assessing counterfactual (3) against the tree in
figure 2. There are two truth-makers of the antecedent of (3) at time
Now:
(i) {(o1,1 pmh1) 7→ 1}, corresponding to occasion O1; and
(ii) {(o2,1:30 pmh2) 7→ 1}, corresponding to O2.
Themeasure of similaritywith actuality ofNow/h1 andNow/h2 is given
by the distance between the time covered by the antecedent truth-maker
on each history and the time at which that history divides from actual-
ity. Since the distance is the same (15 minutes), point Now/h1 is as
similar to actuality as point Now/h2.
Let us generalise this account. We define antec′ as a function from
triples (A, t/h′, h) (where t/h′ is assumed to be an antecedent A-point
and h is the actual history) to times such that:
– if the earliest time t∗ covered by some truth-maker of A at t/h′ is
later than the time of branching hYh′, then antec′(A, t/h′, h) = t∗;
– antec′(A, t/h′, h) is undefined otherwise.
Intuitively, antec′ is (our first shot at) a formal counterpart of the notion
of an antecedent time. Let us note that antec′(A, t/h′, h), if defined, is
required to be later than the time of branching between h and h′. Since
we characterised counterfactuals as conditionals with false antecedents,
we may assume that the antecedent time on a history h′ should be later
than the time at which h′ divides from the actual history h. Now, let us
define a similarity mapping siml′, as follows, where t/h′ is an A-point:
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siml′(A, t/h′, h) = d(hYh′, antec′(A, t/h′, h)).
The values antec′(A, t/h′, h) and siml′(A, t/h′, h) are defined only if the
earliest time covered by some truth-maker of A at t/h′ is after the time
of branching between h and h′. We are now in a position to specify a
relation of comparative similarity between antecedent points:
DLD′-similarity A-point t/h′ is at least as similar to actuality t/h as
A-point t/h′′ iff sml′(A, t/h′, h) ≤ sml′(A, t/h′′, h).
If the similarity relation in CS* is DLD-similarity, the resulting seman-
tics does not fall prey to the coat problem.
Thus, it is tempting to suppose that DLD′-similarity is precisely the
notion we were looking for. This is false, however, as we are going to
argue in the next section.
6 Antecedent times and partial truth
To see why DLD′-similarity is unsatisfying, an example may be useful.
Let then Hp be the formal version of “Always in the past, the Moon was
free from human footprints”, and consider counterfactualHp2→B. Let
th be the present, actual point, and let t′h be the moment on July 20, 1969
of Armstrong’s celebrated ‘one small step’ on the Moon. Clearly, on h,
sentence p is always true up to t′, it becomes false at t′, and is always
false from t′ onwards. Now, consider an antecedent point t/h′. Since
p is always true in the past of th′ , there exists no antec′(Hp, t/h′, h) that
is later than h′Yh. As a consequence, sml′ is undefined for argument
(Hp, t/h′, h), and we cannot assign to t/h′ any measure of similarity to
actuality. The problem is that our ‘official’ notion of antecedent time,
antec′, is in wait of substantial refinement.
To best appreciate the reason why antec′ goes astray, it is useful to
introduce a novel notion, that of partial truth (see also [17, Ch. 5]). Let us
say that a sentence A is partially true at a point t/h in modelMO if, for
some assignment f ∈ I, f is an element of a possible truth-maker of A
at t/h inMO. More formally:
Partial truth A is partially true at a point t/h in modelMO iff, for some3tmk(A, t/h) inMO, we have that 3tmk(A, t/h) ∩ I ̸= ∅. Inter-
section 3tmk(A, t/h) ∩ I is called a partial truth-maker of A at t/h.
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A non-empty partial truth-maker of A is also called a true part (of
content) of A.
The antecedent of counterfactual Hp 2→ B, unlike the other exam-
ples we have considered thus far, is partially true at t/h. Its true part
is the set of assignments {(t′h, p) 7→ 1 : t′h ≺ th}. In general, DLD′-
similarity does not work with counterfactuals whose antecedent is not
completely false. The reason is that, intuitively, DLD′-similarity is only
sensitive to the antecedent truth-makers that cover times on antecedent
histories. In counterfactual reasoning, however, we are not interested
only in what happens on antecedent histories. Rather, we are crucially
interested in the differences between antecedent and actual histories—
more specifically, in the differences that are determined by the truth of
the antecedent. Antecedent times, in turn, may be thought of as times
at which such differences (begin to) surface. Thus, when singling out
antecedent times, we must forget about the parts of the antecedent (as
it were) that are true in both the actual and the antecedent histories, for
these parts correspond to no genuine difference.
Let us try to make these casual remarks more precise. To this aim,
the following definitions are useful:
Completion If g is a possible truth-maker of A at t/h and f ⊆ g is a
partial truth-maker of A at t/h, we call completion of A at t/h the
difference g − f .
Copy If f is a set of assignments on history h′, the copy of f on h is the
set obtained by replacing, for each time t covered by some a ∈ f ,
the moment th′ in the argument of awith th.
Difference-maker A h-difference-maker of A at t/h′ is a subset f of a
truth-maker of A at t/h′ such that the copy of f on h is a comple-
tion of A at t/h.
To illustrate, let us assume that h is the actual history and t/h′ is an
antecedentA-point. A completion ofA at t/h is, intuitively, theminimal
set of assignments that need to be added to a partial truth-maker ofA at
t/h to turn it into a possible truth-maker of A at t/h. The h-difference-
maker ofA at t/h′ is a minimal set of assignments on h′ that, intuitively,
if copied on the actual history h, would makeA true at the actual point
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t/h. Note that if A is completely false at t/h, then all truth-makers of A
at t/h′ are h-difference-makers of A at t/h′.
Let us turn to the resulting, refined notion of antecedent time. If h
is the actual history and t/h′ is an A-point, we let antec(A, t/h′, h) be
the earliest time covered by some h-difference-maker of A at t/h′. In
the Moon example discussed above, antec(Hp, t/h′, h) is, intuitively, the
time of the earliest assignment that we must modify in I to make Hp
actually true at t. Of course, antec(Hp, t/h′, h) is the time of Armstrong’s
‘one small step’.
By appeal to this difference-sensitive notion of antecedent time, we
may define the following, refined counterparts of siml′ and of DLD′-
similarity, respectively:
siml(A, t/h′, h) = d(hYh′, antec(A, t/h′, h));
DLD-similarity A-point t/h′ is at least as similar to actuality t/h as
A-point t/h′′ iff sml(A, t/h′, h) ≤ sml(A, t/h′′, h).
Since DLD-similarity of an A-point t/h′ to actuality is inversely pro-
portional to the length of the non-actual stretch of h′ at the antecedent
time, DLD-similarity vindicates the basic insights behindDLD. Besides,
DLD-similarity helps to get the role of partial truth in counterfactual
reasoning right.
Partial truth antecedents, moreover, highlight an interesting differ-
ence between the notions of antecedent time encoded by antec and by
antec′. When A is completely false at t/h and the antecedent time on h′
is later than hYh′, then siml(A, t/h′, h) = siml′(A, t/h′, h). If A is com-
pletely false at t/h, indeed, every copy on h of a truth-maker of A at
t/h′ is a completion of the unique partial truth-maker of A at t/h (viz.,
a completion of ∅). Accordingly, every truth-maker tmk(A, t/h′) is a h-
difference-maker of A at t/h′, and so the antecedent times we get by
antec′ and antec coincide.
In the face of it, one may be tempted to hold that, if the antecedent
time we get by antec′ on h′ is later than hYh′, then it must coincide with
the antecedent time we get by antec on h′. This is not so, however. Con-
sider the tree in figure 3, where (Pp∧Pq) is false at t/h (for q never holds
on h), but not completely so (for p holds at point t′′/h, which lies in the
past of t/h).
The (unique) truth-maker of (Pp ∧ Pq) at t/h′ is the set of assign-
ments {(p, t′′h′) 7→ 1, (q, t′h′) 7→ 1}, and the earliest time it covers is
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Figure 3: A partial representation of a tree, where atoms p and q never
hold, except at the specified points.
t′′. Accordingly, antec′((Pp ∧ Pq), t/h′, h) = t′′. However, the only h-
difference-maker of (Pp∧Pq) at t/h′ is {(q, t′h′) 7→ 1}, for copying it on h
is sufficient for making (Pp∧Pq) true at the evaluation point t/h. There-
fore, antec((Pp ∧ Pq), t/h′, h) = t′, and thus antec((Pp ∧ Pq), t/h′, h) ̸=
antec′((Pp ∧ Pq), t/h′, h).
This result highlights that antec is sensible to differences between
actuality and antecedent histories that antec′ cannot detect. Intuitively,
for each actual point t/h and antecedent point t/h′, antec picks up the
time at which a difference between h and h′ surfaces, which explains
why the antecedent is true at t/h′ as opposed to t/h.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we have introduced and discussed a ‘dynamic’ version
DLD of the late departure principle. DLD allows us to distil a no-
tion of comparative similarity between histories, which we called DLD-
similarity. Aswehave shown, a counterfactual semantics based onDLD-
similarity retains all the virtues of that based onLD-similarity, but it also
accounts for counterfactuals whose antecedent time is underspecified.
We have argued that this difference is key to solving Bennet’s coat
problem.
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